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Abstract
The global spread of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is an existential threat to humanity, one that has
generated a macrosecuritizing response by states and international organizations. Since the turn of
the century, China has been a source of numerous infectious disease outbreaks. It is also the ori-
gin of the MCR-1 gene, which confers resistance to colistin, a “last-line” antibiotic deployed against
multidrug-resistant infections. With the largest population in the world, coupled with its status as
a major supplier of agricultural produce, evaluating Chinese responses to AMR is critical to under-
standing the efficacy of the global response. Drawing on knowledge of both Chinese politics and
health security, this article analyzes how Chinese actors have responded to the threat in the public
and animal health sectors as well as the domestic and international implications of these responses.
Based on interviews with key Chinese and international officials, scientists, and public health special-
ists, as well as farmers and consumers, we argue that the securitization of AMR in China is currently
more concerned with domestic policy and resource competition than with addressing the existential
health threat. Without a greater alignment of AMR strategies within China, macrosecuritizing efforts
to address the threat globally cannot succeed.
Keywords: China, disease, antimicrobial resistance, securitization
Introduction
Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) denotes the ability of
microbes to become resistant to antimicrobial drugs. Al-
though the threat posed by resistance to antibiotics is
almost as old as their use, it is only now that AMR
is garnering global attention. The World Health Orga-
nization’s (WHO) first global report on AMR surveil-
lance (World Health Organization 2014, IX) summarized
the scope of the threat, stating that, “A post-antibiotic
era—in which common infections and minor injuries can
kill—far from being an apocalyptic fantasy, is instead a
very real possibility for the 21st Century.” Unlike other
newly emergent diseases—severe acute respiratory syn-
drome (SARS), Influenza A virus subtype H5N1, Mid-
dle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS CoV),
and the Zika virus—which all originated in a particular
country,AMR is a truly global threat with novel outbreak
sites in multiple countries.
Analyses of health security threats are frequently
viewed through the lens of securitization (Elbe 2006,
2010; McInnes and Rushton 2013; Davies 2008; Curley
and Herington 2011; Jin and Karackatta 2011). Accord-
ing to the model put forward by Buzan, Wæver, and de
Wilde 1998, an existential threat is first identified and
accepted by an audience before a series of resource real-
locations and policy responses is undertaken (emergency
mode processes and policies) to resolve it. At its heart,
the model presupposes that the initial actions taken by
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securitizing actors and agencies represent a rational at-
tempt to resolve an existential threat to human exis-
tence. While the elements of this model have long been
criticized—in terms of an overemphasis on the verbal na-
ture of speech acts (Williams 2003; Möller 2007), the
neglect of the role of audiences (Balzacq 2005; Vaughn
2009), or the Eurocentric nature of its agenda (Vuori
2008)—Buzan and Wæver (2009) have also observed
that the theoretical and empirical space between the state
and the global levels needs more attention.
In addressing this gap, Buzan and Wæver (2009, 256)
extended the theoretical reach of the securitization model
to include macrosecuritization, which is an “overarch-
ing securitization that relates, organizes and possibly sub-
sumes a host of other middle-level securitizations.” Such
umbrella forms of securitization can either impose hi-
erarchies “on the lower level ones incorporated within
them” or simply “bundle the other securitizations to-
gether without outranking them.” Given the multiplic-
ity of actors and interests enveloped by macrosecuriti-
zations, the structure of the process is more unstable
than traditional forms of securitization. In particular,
middle-level actors—and their attendant securitization
processes—can become disaffected with their subordina-
tion to the higher-level process. Due to the global spread
of infectious diseases and related health threats (such as
AMR), the concurrent securitization responses provide
valuable case studies wherein the conceptual utility of
macrosecuritization can be evaluated (Lo and Thomas
2018).
A shortcoming with macrosecuritization is that it
makes very realist assumptions as to the nature of the
middle tier, whereby states are considered as units for
analysis with insufficient power accorded to substate and
subnational actors. By consciously not integrating lower-
tier actors and processes into the macrosecuritization
framework, we argue that the model has suboptimal the-
oretical utility. It is only by understanding the perceptions
and behaviors of these actors that it is possible to as-
certain whether an issue has been securitized or not. As
will be shown later in this article, from a surface read-
ing of Chinese responses to AMR it would be possible
to conclude that a middle-tier securitization—one that is
integrated into a macrosecuritization—has taken place.
Chinese officials, state media, and bureaucracies have all
committed speech acts to support global efforts to ad-
dress the existential threat of AMR. This is supported by
domestic policy and technical communities that have re-
allocated funds and developed new policies and practices
to address AMR threats.
However, the findings from our fieldwork suggest that
a conclusion based solely on these moves does not fully
capture the motivations of the securitization of AMR in
China. The perception of AMR as an existential threat—
one that requires immediate emergency responses—is not
present at the subnational level. Instead, we argue that
AMR has been securitized by national authorities to en-
force central health policy control over subnational au-
thorities, the general population, or local market actors.
This is necessitated by the presence of competing lower-
level policy and economic logics.
In making this argument, we propose to first con-
textualize the political-policy environment within which
middle-tier securitizations take place. This follows Buzan
and Wæver’s observation that we must “understand the
tensions between overarching macrosecuritizations and
the lower level securitizations that they contain and coor-
dinate” and provides an initial contribution to answering
how “macrosecuritisations [are] affected when they have
to incorporate a new lower level securitization which
undermines commitment to a larger goal” (Buzan and
Wæver 2009, 275). Implicit in this observation is the fact
that it cannot be assumed that lower tiers will automat-
ically follow middle-tier securitization processes—even
in authoritarian systems. Ever since the 1980s, there has
been a fragmentation of bureaucratic power in China be-
tween national and subnational actors. This fragmenta-
tion goes well beyond just the health sector to include
economic policies, environmental regulations, and other
areas of governance. Usually these are issues of domestic
politics but the centrality of the Chinese biomedical and
agribusiness sectors to international AMR efforts means
that understanding Chinese policy and practice reactions
to AMR is critical to evaluating the macrosecuritization
of AMR globally.
During the 2016–2017 academic year, we con-
ducted interviews in Beijing, Hangzhou, and Guangdong
provinces to examine the current state of AMR poli-
cies and their application across China. This study was
motivated by a move made on the part of the Chi-
nese leadership to securitize the threat without an epi-
demiological trigger event that would rationalize such
a decision (as occurred with, for example, the SARS
outbreaks in Foshan and Hong Kong). In our initial in-
terviews, we met with leading microbiologists, infectious
disease specialists, and epidemiologists from the Chi-
nese Academy of Sciences, the China Center for Disease
Control and Prevention (China CDC), key research lab-
oratories, and local universities. These interviews were
supplemented with a second series of interviews with rep-
resentatives from international health agencies (in China
and globally), with public health specialists from other
countries based in China, and with local researchers
engaged in disease surveillance. Finally, we met with
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Chinese farmers engaged in poultry and pork production.
These interviews were conducted in Cantonese, English,
or Mandarin under the Chatham House Rule. Although
most of our secondary material is in English, we also en-
gaged with Chinese-language publications.
After more deeply exploring the nature of macrose-
curitization and its utility in analyzing AMR, we con-
sider three dimensions of the Chinese response to AMR,
namely: (1) how China has framed AMR as an existen-
tial health threat; (2) how antibiotics are used in Chinese
society; and (3) how antibiotics are used in Chinese farm-
ing. Finally, we consider the implications of this analysis
in two key areas: (1) the implications of AMR strategies
on domestic politics and policy making; and (2) the role
of the international community in securitizing AMR in
China.
Macrosecuritization and AMR
Macrosecuritization emerged from securitization theory.
Developed by the Copenhagen School of Barry Buzan,
OleWæver, and Jaap deWilde, securitization is a theoret-
ical framework depicting the threat-framing process and
the corresponding political reactions to eliminate a per-
ceived threat. Most securitizations take place at the state
and individual levels. The theorists believe that such a vi-
brant agenda at the middle level is attributed to the sim-
plicity of identifying the referent objects in the securiti-
zation process. While the preceding middle-level security
studies are of significance to enrich the research agenda of
“niche” securitizations, what is still missing is the discus-
sion of “what happens above [or below] the middle-level
securitization (Buzan and Wæver 2009, 253).”
In filling the theoretical and empirical gap of secu-
ritization theory, Buzan and Wæver suggested the con-
cept of macrosecuritization. Macrosecuritization refers
to an “overarching securitization that relates, organizes
and possibly subsumes a host of other middle-level se-
curitizations” (Buzan and Wæver 2009, 256). Pertain-
ing to the relationship between macrosecuritization and
its corresponding middle-level securitizations, Buzan and
Wæver stated that the strongest form of macrosecuri-
tization, such as the Cold War, “will impose a hierar-
chy on the lower level ones incorporated within them.”
The less powerful ones, such as the Global War on Ter-
ror (GWoT), will “bundle other securitizations together
without outranking them” (Ibid). The relationship be-
tween macrosecuritization and middle-level securitiza-
tions is, however, not necessarily peaceful. The structure
is “vulnerable to breakdowns not just by desecuritiza-
tion of the macro-level threat (or referent object). . .
but also by the middle-level securitizations becoming
disaffected with, or pulling away from, subordination to
the higher level one” (Ibid).Owing to its large-scale, com-
plex, and fairly unstable configuration, macrosecuritiza-
tions have only been recognized in a handful of cases:
the Cold War (Buzan and Wæver 2009), piracy (Bueger
and Stockbruegger 2013), and theGWoT (Romaniuk and
Webb 2015). Lo and Thomas (2018) added AMR as an-
other case of macrosecuritization, based on the extent to
which AMR responses fulfill the basic format of macrose-
curitization and have been securitized at the global level.
However, the relationships between the macro, middle,
and lower tiers remain understudied.
Since the turn of the century, public health threats
have been increasingly securitized, wherein threats have
exceeded a state’s individual capacity to resolve them via
regular political processes or via unilateral emergency
measures. The securitization of HIV/AIDS in July 2000
by the United Nations Security Council was the first
of these moves, which recognized that the global na-
ture of the threat exceeded member states’ capacities to
deal with it unilaterally (United Nations 2000). To re-
solve such threats has required additional capacity be-
ing contributed from either the international community
or other states, or both. Yet, frequently (in the cases of
SARS, MERS, or Zika), the resulting alliances of states,
corporations, and/or civil society actors have been “tem-
porary and instrumental” (Buzan andWæver 2009, 256).
Once the threat has ended or been sufficiently addressed,
states return to using regular policies and practices.How-
ever, some threats are of a longer term or are sufficiently
threatening as to require a larger-scale response. These
types of threats—exemplified by new and re-emergent
health threats—“are universalist because they take the
physical fate of humankind as their referent object” (Ibid,
261).
In the case of AMR, a macrosecuritization approach
has utility, given the universalist nature of the threat
and its global spread. As all countries are either al-
ready afflicted by AMR or threatened by its spread,
a multilevel collaborative approach of the type de-
scribed by Buzan and Wæver (2009) is necessary. How-
ever, this assumes that all countries regard the threat
posed by AMR in a similar manner. In the United
States, Commissioner of Food and Drugs, Scott Gottlieb
(2018), stated that AMR was “a global public health
threat.” In Europe, European Union (EU) Commissioner,
Vytenis Andriukaitis (2017), declared that, “In 2001, an-
timicrobial resistance was a budding global public health
threat. In the years since, it has grown into one of the
biggest global threats not only to our health, but also to
our environment, our food chain and our economies.”
In the United Kingdom (UK), Chief Medical Officer,
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Sara Davies (2013), stated that, “Antimicrobial resistance
poses a catastrophic threat.” Each of these statements—
and their accompanying text—are clear indications that
AMR is perceived as an existential threat, one not limited
just to the health sector.
As Gottlieb (2018) further noted, “The CDC esti-
mates that the direct costs of antimicrobial resistance
on the U.S. economy is $20 billion annually. When you
factor in the economic consequences of lost productiv-
ity, it adds an additional $35 billion in costs.” At the
global level, the World Bank estimates that, by 2050,
AMR could cause annual global Gross Domestic Prod-
uct [GDP] to fall between 1.1 and 3.8 percent, with in-
creases in healthcare costs ranging from US$330 billion
to US$1.1 trillion per year (World Bank 2017, 15–22).
As a result, these countries have moved beyond speech
acts to emergency mode reallocations of resources to ad-
dress AMR. For example, in 2015 the United States al-
located close to double the funding to different federal
agencies to address the threat posed by AMR. Of the
US$1.2 billion allocated, over US$1 billion was related to
public health aspects of anti-AMR programs, with the re-
maining funds targeted to animal and agricultural AMR
strategies (White House 2015). Between 2007 and 2013,
the EU allocated €314.1 million (∼US$357 million) to
AMR prevention programs (Kelly et al. 2016, 436), with
member states making their own contributions. The UK,
for example, has two funds for global AMR activities—
the Fleming Fund and the Longitude Prize—which to-
gether contribute £295 million (∼US$382 million).
In contrast, in 2016, Indian Prime Minister Narendra
Modi stated that “India recognizes anti-microbial resis-
tance as one of the major global threats to public health”
(O’Neill 2016). This speech act coincided with the devel-
opment of India’s new National Action Plan on AMR,
which was promulgated in April 2017. In that fiscal year
(2016–2017), India allocated an additional 1.16 cr ru-
pees (∼US$16,390,000) to address AMR. However, by
2017–2018, this figure had fallen to zero (Sinha 2018).
This is despite the fact that India is one of the largest con-
sumer markets for antibiotics. Indeed, in 2010 it was the
largest market globally but, by 2017, it had fallen behind
China (Van Boeckel et al. 2014, 745). Interviews we con-
ducted in Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Viet-
nam in 2016–2017 all highlighted a similar disjuncture
between rhetoric and intent. In each case, despite speech
acts signaling an intention to address the threat posed by
AMR, new resource allocations were negligible or short-
lived—with the international community being a major
source of funding on the issue. Moreover, the allocation
of the new funds was a source of competition between
different ministries, leading to resource mismanagement.
At the same time, a senior agricultural official for an in-
ternational organization noted that, regionally, there was
“no data sharing between different stakeholders, because
they only see the downside of sharing data” (Interview J
2017).
The difference in these commitments has a critical
theoretical implication for understanding the macrose-
curitization of AMR, generally, and in the Chinese case,
specifically. In particular, these differences highlight our
argument that the intentions of lower-tier securitization
processes must be clarified in order to properly assess the
success (or otherwise) of a macrosecuritization act. As we
argue in this article, for successful macrosecuritization to
take place, all levels of the process must be aligned. As
Balzacq (2005, 171) argues, “effective securitization is
audience centered.” For Buzan and Wæver’s model, this
means that if there are competing interests for lower-level
audiences, then the macrosecuritization process would be
imperfect, at best, and unsuccessful, at worst.
AMR in China
China is the world’s most serious abuser of antibiotics.
(Jiefang Daily 2010).
Approximately 162,000 tons of antibiotics were con-
sumed in China in 2013.Of these, human uses accounted
for roughly 48 percent of consumption, with the rest be-
ing allocated to the agricultural sector (Tang et al. 2016).
As such, not only do Chinese people lead the world in
per capita antibiotic consumption, but also the country
is the largest user of antibiotics in the livestock indus-
try, which is only going to increase (Khazan 2015). This
high use of antibiotics places China at the heart of global
antimicrobial strategies. As with outbreaks of SARS and
H5N1 in the first decade of this century, without a ro-
bust intervention strategy from China, the global effort
to combat AMR will fall short of its eradication goal.
This section advances our understanding of AMR as a
health security threat in China. We first present a gen-
eral overview of the rise of AMR as a policy issue before
moving on to the issue with specific reference to humans
first and animals second. Although these sectors are con-
sidered separately, this is a somewhat artificial divide. As
will be shown in the following analysis, the basis for the
threat posed by AMR is interchangeably located in both
human practices and livestock production and is exacer-
bated by policy and regulatory shortcomings.
The Chinese government has only officially recog-
nized the AMR problem in China over the past decade,
although it has been monitoring the issue since 2004
(Interview A 2017). A 2013 figure showed that, on
average, each Chinese person consumed 138 grams of
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antibiotics annually, which is ten times more than the av-
erage volume consumed per capita in the United States
(China Daily 2016). This pattern of antibiotic abuse is
similarly observed in the livestock sector. Of the 210,000
tons of antibiotics made in China in 2006, a half was used
to feed livestock for growth promotion and disease con-
trol (Collignon and Voss 2015). As the largest antimicro-
bial consumer for food animals, a 2015 study estimated
that the Chinese livestock industry will represent one-
third of antimicrobial production worldwide by 2030
(Van Boeckel 2015). While nationally comparative data
is difficult to identify, a 2011–2015 study by Wushouer
et al. (2017, 6–7) found that there was a “higher per
capita consumption percentage in China during the study
period than in at least 75 percent of the 29 European
countries in terms of the consumption of third- and
fourth-generation cephalosporins, as well as consump-
tion of the fluoroquinolones.”
The overuse of antibiotics in humans and livestock for
both therapeutic and prophylactic purposes has been di-
rectly linked to the rampant spread of AMR in China.1
Surveillance data show that AMR resistance to Neis-
seria gonorrhoeae and resistance to penicillin, tetracy-
cline, and ciprofloxacin are widespread in China (Chen
et al. 2016). Xiao et al. (2011) found that approximately
70 percent of Escherichia coli (E. coli) samples are re-
sistant to ciprofloxacin, while 60 percent are resistant
to third-generation cephalosporins. Multidrug resistant
and pan-resistant strains have been reported for Pseu-
domonas aeruginosa and Salmonella Pullorum, while
pan-resistant strains have also been identified for Acine-
tobacter baumannii in human nosocomial settings. A
2005 study showed that antibiotic abuse kills 80,000
Chinese people annually and has increased medical ex-
penditures by 80 billion yuan (US$11.7 billion) per year
(cited in Huang 2009). A 2016 report on the impact of
AMR in China estimated that without prompt interven-
tion, this problem could result in one million premature
deaths annually by 2050 (Shan 2016). In other words,
the potential existential threat to China from AMR has
been well established.
However, given the long gestation of this threat,
the question that naturally emerges is, why securitize it
now? As China’s Permanent Representative to the United
Nations, Liu Jie, stated, “We are in a race against time.
We need to make every moment count and intensify our
1 From information available, this suggests that high
volumes of sulphonamides, tetracyclines, and fluoro-
quinolones (enrofloxacin, fleroxacin, and norfloxacin) are
widely used in the agriculture sector in China (Collignon
and Voss 2015).
actions. We cannot afford to lose this competition” (Li
2017). Interviews with international health representa-
tives and public health officials and clinicians in China
suggest that two key factors have come together to in-
crease policy awareness of this threat. The first factor
concerns the lack of new antibiotics being released. Only
small profit margins are available to pharmaceutical
companies for the development and sale of new antibi-
otics, for which resistance would not be an issue. As a re-
sult, growing resistance to existing antibiotics is not being
mitigated by new antibiotics coming to market. As Khor
(2016) observed, “AMR is not confined to just a health
issue—the entire situation is increasingly recognized as
a market failure. Due to perceived poor returns on in-
vestment, the development of new antibiotics has almost
come to a halt.” Indeed, in 2018, Novartis joined As-
traZeneca, Sanofi, Bristol-Myers Squibb, and Allergan in
exiting the antibiotic development field, further limiting
the pool of possible sources of new antibiotics (Megget
2018). This challenges an earlier mentality on antibiotics
that one interviewee succinctly described as follows: “In
the past, scientists and policy makers believed that as
long as new antibiotics rolled out there was nothing to
worry about” (Interview A 2017). The rapidly narrow-
ing gap between what is available and what is viable has
contributed to a heightened sense of threat from AMR.
However, at the same time, the departure of five major
pharmaceutical companies from antibiotic research and
development also challenges the assumption that a suc-
cessful macrosecuritization of AMR has taken place. If
it had, it could have been expected that development of
new antibiotics would have been stepped up and/or more
new companies would have entered the market.
The second factor concerns the fact that, in a post-
SARS environment, there is pressure on the Chinese state
(and by extension the Party) to ensure a safe public
health environment. Every subsequent outbreak (H5N1,
H1N1, H7N9, and MERS-CoV), coupled with episodic
food safety issues, have raised social questions surround-
ing efficient and competent governance by local and na-
tional authorities. In terms of AMR, “in the wake of
the SARS outbreak, the Chinese government was aware
of the AMR problem, thereby establishing the Ministry
of Health National Antimicrobial Resistance Surveil-
lance Net (MOHNARIN) in 2005. Currently over 1,300
hospitals are included in the sentinel surveillance sys-
tem” (Interview A 2017). However, MOHNARIN is
a passive surveillance system with no incentives that
punish hospitals when they fail to report their findings.
Indeed, several interviewees noted that hospitals can will-
fully withhold samples to argue for more equipment and
upgraded capacities (human and technical). While such
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behavior only exacerbates risks posed by AMR, it also
demonstrates that AMR is not considered an existential
threat by these frontline healthcare providers. Theoreti-
cally, samples should be shared as a means to ensure sur-
vival. Instead, samples are used as bargaining chips to
secure more resources. This behavior also reflects “the
emperor is far away” reality of Chinese policy making.
Even when a national program is in place, subnational
actors can still subvert the ends of the program for their
own means.
In 2015, the centrality of Chinese health governance
to the global AMR debate was highlighted by the identifi-
cation of a mobilized colistin resistance (or MCR-1) gene
in a pig. This discovery was important, as the gene pro-
vides bacteria with resistance to colistin, a last-line antibi-
otic (Gao et al. 2016). As with SARS, it is likely that the
gene was in circulation in China before the initial study
reported its existence. MCR-1’s emergence is likely due
to Chinese farmers, who regularly feed livestock colistin
prophylactically.2 A 2016 study revealed that 21 percent
of pigs in China carried bacteria with MCR-1, as did 15
percent of tested chicken and pork meat samples as well
as 1 percent of all hospitalized Chinese patients (Liu et al.
2016). As of March 2017, the gene had been detected in
humans, animals, and livestock products in North Amer-
ica, Europe, and Asia (Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention 2017). Hence, even though the initial creation
of the gene is likely a result of inappropriately utilized
antibiotics for livestock production, it has developed
multiple avenues for transmission beyond its original
environment.
The identification of MCR-1 not only raised further
questions regarding health governance but also raised
questions regarding the relationship between business in-
terests and officials, and the capacities of the central lead-
ership to implement reforms in the face of local opposi-
tion. As one interviewee observed, “In the US it is about
the lobby groups; in China, politicians and medical in-
stitutions are the ones influencing the policy making. In
China, there are over 6,000 pharmaceutical companies.
Some pharmaceutical companies are one province’s eco-
nomic pillars” (Interview A 2017). This statement fur-
ther confirms an important facet of Chinese health policy;
namely, that despite its status as a one-party state, the de-
centralized nature of the contemporary state means that
local officials can resist or subvert central policies when
they are not in their economic or political interest.
2 It should be noted that colistin is not used in Chinese clin-
ics. It is only used in China for livestock production (BBC
Zhongwen 2017).
In August 2016, President Xi Jinping unveiled a Na-
tional Action Plan (NAP) to Contain Antimicrobial Re-
sistance (2016–2020) in an attempt to push through a
centralized AMR strategy. The NAP was quite specific
in identifying areas whose shortcomings fostered AMR,
stating that it:
has become increasingly prominent due to insufficient
research and development capacity of new antimi-
crobials, sales of antimicrobials without prescriptions
in pharmacies, irrational use of antibacterial agents
in medical and food animal sectors, non-compliant
waste emissions of pharmaceutical enterprises, as well
as lack of public awareness toward rational use of an-
timicrobials. (National Health and Family Planning
Commission 2016a)
Here the NAP drew on lessons learned from ear-
lier infectious disease outbreaks (e.g., HIV/AIDS) to in-
volve a wide array of 14 central-level ministries and com-
missions. However, it is telling that despite most of the
“known unknown” threats of antibiotic misuse stem-
ming from inappropriate usage in agricultural activities,
the lead bodies of the NAP are the National Health
and Family Planning Commission (NHFPC) and the Na-
tional Development and Reform Commission (NDRC).
While earlier cooperative efforts between the NHFPC
and the Ministry of Agriculture are acknowledged in the
NAP (National Health and Family Planning Commission
2016b), this means that the primary focus for interven-
tion is on human misuse (i.e., an area that can be man-
aged without jeopardizing China’s performance in a key
area of the economy).
This policy focus on the misuse of antibiotics by peo-
ple does correspond with a general sentiment observed
among our interviewees. Despite this, antibiotics, by vol-
ume, are more widely used in agricultural activities, with
nearly half “deployed in food animals” alone (Collignon
andVoss 2015, 2). Further, in regard to understanding the
volume of antibiotics provided prophylactically through
feed, China faces the same problem as other countries
in that such data are considered commercially sensitive
and are not provided by companies.3 However, given
that eight of the top twenty global producers of animal
feed are Chinese companies (WattAgNet.com 2017), all
of which have state ties, this should not be as much of a
barrier for the Chinese government as for its counterparts
around the world. Indeed, given that Chinese authorities
3 A study by Enting et al. (2010) does explore the compo-
sition of animal feed produced in China, but the authors
did not consider antibiotic inclusion, focusing instead on
vitamins.
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have (occasionally) paid scant regard to commercial sen-
sitivities in areas of industrial intellectual property, their
reticence to do so in this area only highlights the eco-
nomic sensitivity of agriculture. In terms of framing AMR
in China, this economic prioritization challenges the ex-
istential nature of the threat, limiting its immediacy and
giving preference to rhetorical and discursive securitiza-
tion over a full shift into emergency mode. To better ex-
plore why this is the case, the threat posed by AMR to the
human and animal populations will now be considered.
Human Use of Antibiotics in China
The time may come when penicillin can be bought by
anyone in the shops. Then there is the danger that the
ignorant man may easily underdose himself and by
exposing his microbes to non-lethal quantities of the
drug make them resistant… Moral: If you use peni-
cillin, use enough. (Fleming 1945)
Alexander Fleming’s 1945 Nobel Prize address in-
cluded a prescient warning on the dangers of misusing
antibiotics, but this represents only half of the equation.
Fleming’s comments were made at a time when antibi-
otic supplies were still limited for most people and a
year before biochemists identified the use of antibiotics
as growth promoters in livestock. While the develop-
ment of resistance can originate from insufficient quan-
tities of antibiotics, a host can be equally endangered
from using too many antibiotics. In China, the latter is-
sue is more severe within the population. A nationwide
survey of 230,800 prescriptions, given across 784 com-
munity health institutions in twenty-eight Chinese cities
from 2007 to 2009, shows that the number of antibiotic
prescriptions given was two times more than that rec-
ommended by the WHO (Li et al. 2012). Another report
showed that roughly 57 percent of people in China had
received antibiotics over the previous six months in 2015
(Zhongguo pinglun tongxunshe 2015). This was an issue
that Fleming could not have foreseen (i.e., that the level
of resistance in a population can be a medical threat as
much as an individual’s resistance).
It is also a cultural trend in China that people take
too much medicine to treat illnesses that do not require
antibiotics while simultaneously failing to follow cor-
rect treatment protocols. To make this situation worse,
patients with either minor ailments or non-serious ill-
nesses frequently seek to have antibiotics intravenously
administered from healthcare providers at all levels (ter-
tiary, secondary, and primary). This is due to the widely
held belief that an intravenous (IV) drip (dadiandi) is a
panacea for all kinds of illnesses. A 2009 study indicated
that the average person in China consumes eight bottles
of IV infusion fluid per year against a world average of
2.5–3.3 bottles per person (World Health Organization
2012). This figure highlights not only the role that IV an-
tibiotic injections play in the rampant misuse and overuse
of antibiotics in the country but also the complicity of
healthcare professionals and institutions in the inappro-
priate provision of medicine.
Apart from this behavior, inadequate government in-
vestments in healthcare have resulted in a reliance on
drug sales to generate revenues to cover operational ex-
penses. A 2014 study demonstrated that antibiotic sales
accounted for 22.8 percent of revenues from all drug
sales made through primary healthcare facilities (Wang,
Wang, and Wang 2014).While the profitability of antibi-
otic sales in healthcare settings varies in different regions
of China, these figures underscore financial incentives for
medical staff to sell high volumes of unnecessary and ex-
pensive antibiotics to patients. In exploring issues related
to the human use of antibiotics, the following section an-
alyzes the efficacy of regulatory approaches imposed by
the Chinese state. We suggest that while cultural habits
are the most difficult for any state to change, the efficacy
of the regulatory environment of the health sector is the
one single issue that must be addressed if AMR threats
are to be resolved.
Policy Responses to the Human Use of
Antibiotics in China
Since the turn of the century, the Chinese government
has adopted various strategies to limit reliance on phar-
maceuticals, including antibiotics. The China Food and
Drug Administration (CFDA) and the NHFPC are the
two main government agencies tasked with regulating
antibiotics in China. The former agency is responsible for
registering, producing, and distributing medicines, while
the latter oversees the clinical use of antibiotics in phar-
macies and health facilities (Cui et al. 2017). Prior to
2004, there was no specific law or regulation on an-
tibiotics use in China; general medicines (including an-
tibiotics) were regulated under the Drug Administration
Law of the People’s Republic of China. This law was
adopted at the 7th Meeting of the Standing Committee
of the SixthNational Peoples’ Congress on September 20,
1984, and was revised at the 20th Meeting of the Stand-
ing Committee of the Ninth National Peoples’ Congress
on February 28, 2001 (China Food and Drug Admin-
istration 2001). (NHFPC 2004) to regulate the clinical
use of antibiotics. (MoH 2012), which further reinforced
the 2004 guidelines to curb the human abuse of antibi-
otics. However, despite China’s reputation as a centrally
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run state, the guidelines were only imperfectly followed
at all levels of the domestic healthcare system, as the fi-
nancial opportunities to be made from overselling antibi-
otics were too great, and demand from the population
remained strong.
In response, the government introduced the Essential
Drug List (EDL) in 2009 to curb the misuse of antibi-
otics by its citizens by capping the financial benefits that
healthcare providers could accrue from the sale of antibi-
otics. However, while some studies show a slight reduc-
tion in the prescription of antibiotics (Song et al. 2014),
the use of such medicines remains high. Currie, Lin, and
Meng (2014) observed that despite the EDL being im-
plemented, social behaviors in China with respect to the
use and supply of antibiotics have not changed, with pa-
tients still wanting antibiotics and with doctors still will-
ing to prescribe them beyond what patients’ conditions
warrant. In addition, there is an entrenched habit among
patients to seek antibiotics by engaging in polypharma-
ceutical behaviors either by visiting numerous doctors for
the same condition or by purchasing multiple courses of
drugs from pharmacies.4 As multiple studies have noted,
prescriptions for antibiotics account for roughly half of
all prescriptions made by doctors (Yin et al. 2013; Lin
et al. 2016).
One main reason for the overprescription of antibi-
otics lies in a lack of health budgets. Public hospitals re-
ceive only 10 percent of their funding from the govern-
ment, and so they make up the 90 percent shortfall by
charging patients for medicine (Lazarus 2016).More im-
portantly, public hospitals are allowed to sell medicines
and antibiotics with a 15 percent markup to cover oper-
ation expenses. Regulatory attempts made by the state in
2009 to cancel this markup practice as part of the EDL re-
form did not, however, effectively resolve the problem, as
problems related to financial incentives were not fully ad-
dressed. The latest effort to address this issue is the 2017
Trial Opinion on the Implementation of a Two-Invoice
System for Public Medical Institutions’ Drug Procure-
4 An instance one researcher directly observed involved
a single individual using a collection of identity cards to
purchase multiple courses of antibiotics. The medicines
were prescribed for a single individual, whose friends
and family members loaned him their cards. The phar-
macy’s records simply noted a series of individuals who
had come in on the same day to purchase the same
medicine. The intent of the individual purchasing these
drugs remained completely open and, by using a set of
identity cards, the pharmacist involved was able to make
a profit while still having a record showing that they were
operating within the rules.
ment, or the “two-invoice system” for public medical
institutions. Under the new system, manufacturers send
their products to a distributor, and these products are
then transported directly to hospitals or clinics (Li and
Sindik 2017). This is an important reform developed to
standardize drug circulation, to reduce the number of
drugs in circulation, and thus to lower drug prices (as
prices increase with the number of distributors and inter-
mediaries involved/with the number of invoices issued).
However, a senior AMR scientist commented that, “with-
out an increase in budgets to public hospitals, medical in-
stitutions have to find ways to gain profits to sustain daily
operations.Whenever there is a need for healthcare facil-
ities to determine their own budgets (intermediate envi-
ronment), the problem of AMR cannot be mitigated in
China” (Interview A 2017).
This resources shortfall again highlights the problem-
atic nature of AMR securitization in China. If the Chinese
authorities had actually securitized AMR, there should
have been a corresponding shift of resources into key
sectors and institutions (such as hospitals). While fund-
ing to the public healthcare sector has increased in per-
centage terms (State Council 2017), it is coming off a
low base, one where most of the new fiscal capacity is
to support long-term institution building rather than di-
rectly addressing an existential threat from AMR or sim-
ilar health insecurities (Süssmuth-Dyklerhoff and Wang
2010). As McInnes and Rushton (2013, 128) argue, “al-
though the absence of emergency measures may not in
itself be conclusive, it may offer an indication that an is-
sue has not been fully securitized.” In the absence of a
resources shift by Chinese authorities, it is hard to argue
that the motivation for securitizing AMR is to deal with
the perception of it as an existential threat.
The absence of centralized patient drug registries be-
tween doctors and between pharmacies and local health-
care providers has created another gap through which
antibiotic abuse can continue. While some administra-
tive regions, such as Shanghai, have developed strate-
gies to regulate antibiotic distribution through the public
health system at tertiary hospitals, this has limited effi-
cacy when aggregated at the national level. In response to
the 2009 National Essential Medicines Policy (NEMP),
the Shanghai government instituted new policies whereby
“presidents of hospitals were required to take full re-
sponsibilities [sic] for the use of antibiotics and were sub-
jected to annual assessments of performance, resulting in
potential dismissals or promotions” (Y. Lin et al. 2016,
1,724). While such policies are credited with reducing
antibiotic usage in public hospitals, most healthcare ser-
vices in China are delivered by primary providers, mean-
ing that the effects of such practices are limited to the
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national level (Zhang et al. 2017). Moreover, there are
spatial inequalities in the distribution of resources for
hospitals across China, with institutions in the eastern
developed states receiving more resources than those in
the poorer central and western regions.
However, economic status does not automatically
guarantee a better understanding of the role of antibiotics
in treating infections. As Barber et al. (2013, 2) stated,
“Economic and demographic factors have resulted in in-
creased demand for essential medicines.” This is partic-
ularly the case in urban areas where “residents tend to
have higher disposable income, and access to a greater
supply of medical products and services.” Although
Barber et al.’s study focuses on non-communicable dis-
eases (NCDs), their conclusions on the misuse of antibi-
otics are supported by Bu et al. (2016, 1,388), who de-
termined that “the spatial distribution of antibiotics uses
is determined by the economic status in China where
wealth and resource are unevenly distributed and that are
undergoing dramatic change.” In the case of wealthier ar-
eas (which are always urban areas in China), the authors
note that the per capita actual-use volume of antibiotics
is higher in these areas and that this could be attributed
to the abuse of antibiotics.
Lowy (2003, 1,266) concluded that the emergence
of AMR first “in hospitals and then spreading to the
community, is now a well-established pattern that re-
curs with each new wave of antimicrobial resistance.”
However, in the case of China, it is not clear whether
this pattern holds true. While hospitals remain impor-
tant sites for addressing AMR, the disaggregated nature
of the Chinese public health system means that frontlines
for the development of AMR are far more community-
based than they are in more developed countries. The
most obvious area where this can be seen is in the distri-
bution of antibiotics and other medicines. Here, the dis-
tribution of and access to antibiotics—frequently in un-
regulated or under-regulated environments—mean that
Chinese waves of resistance are disaggregated across the
country, fueled by mutually reinforcing public and ani-
mal sources. This presents a significant challenge to do-
mestic and global efforts to combat the threat posed by
AMR.
This is also a clear outcome of a profound lack of
public education on drugs and medicines within local
communities and in the school system. A senior Chi-
nese AMR scientist stated, “People have low awareness
of AMR issues because few media outlets report on the
problem. For example, there are many anti-tobacco ad-
vertisements, but there are none on AMR. There is also
no education campaign on antibiotic use in primary and
secondary schools” (Interview A 2017). One university
academic in Beijing likewise stated, “Education on the
proper use of antibiotics is nonexistent in schools. There
is no booklet/poster on the proper use of antibiotics in ru-
ral health facilities” (Interview B 2016). These opinions
are further supported by a senior officer of an interna-
tional financial institution, who concluded that, “Health
promotion in China is merely about information giving.
Insufficient information or knowledge does not change
people’s behaviors. People still kill and eat sick chick-
ens; others believe that if one falls sick after eating a sick
chicken, this is just a result of bad luck” (Interview C
2017). Within the Chinese system, a lack of such edu-
cation campaigns reinforces our point that without pub-
lic awareness of the issue, there cannot be audience ac-
ceptance of the securitizing act, particularly at the lower
tiers, restricting attempts to securitize the threat beyond
the middle tier.5
Indeed, it would be a mistake to assume that simply
because Beijing has developed new policies and regula-
tions on the use of antibiotics, such policies should be
automatically implemented nationally (even with the se-
curitizing move). As Hu (2013) observed, there are differ-
ences in ways that the policies are implemented between
provinces and between the public and private healthcare
sectors. This is supported by Qian (2015, 31–2), who
concluded that “local bureaus are likely to be account-
able for the local government leaders rather than their
ministries when implementing the health reform (e.g., lo-
cal health bureau vs the NHFPC), which makes the coor-
dination among government departments at the central
level even more complicated.” In terms of macrosecuri-
tization, this suggests that even in authoritarian states,
substate actors have the capacity to prioritize competing
strategies over national-level securitization acts. This re-
inforces Buzan and Wæver’s (2009, 275) point that it is
necessary to consider the lower tiers when evaluating a
successful macrosecuritization.
Use of Antibiotics in the Food Chain
The post-1970s agricultural sector in China has been
shaped by three mutually reinforcing drivers. The first
has been the country’s economic liberalization. Initially
promoted by Deng Xiaoping, China has since become a
global economic player that is deeply enmeshed in the in-
ternational trade system. This has led to rising incomes
and to a shift in patterns of food consumption away from
a grain-based diet to one whereinmeat plays amore dom-
inant role. In terms of international trade, this long-term
5 A similar restriction occurs with the securitization of
HIV/AIDS in China (Lo 2015).
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period of economic development has also led to more in-
tensified livestock product trade, coupled with an aware-
ness of the importance of quality control. The latter fac-
tor in particular is supporting a growth in imports from
overseas markets that are perceived to be safe and/or a
source of higher-quality meats (e.g., Australia, Canada,
and New Zealand). However, even though food safety is
an ongoing issue for Chinese consumers, it is focused on
more explicit problems—melamine in dairy products, for
example—and less on the presence of antibiotics in local
food production processes.
While the “open door”strategy was primarily focused
on the industrial sector, parallel reforms made in the agri-
cultural sector have caused China’s production of live-
stock to rise significantly. This is the second of the three
drivers. In reference to the cattle sector, Qiu, Ju, and
Chang (undated) estimated that there were only 100,000
head of cattle in 1949. By 2013, this had increased to over
113 million head of cattle (Han et al. 2016). As Sampaio
stated in Reed and Rodrigo (2015), “Beef consumption
is directly related to income. China has rising incomes
and a large population. This is reflected in an increase in
protein consumption.” Similarly, Chinese pork produc-
tion levels have increased sevenfold since the late 1970s,
rendering China the largest consumer and producer of
swine products in the world (The Economist 2014). In
line with these trends, Chinese production of poultry and
eggs has also increased markedly since the liberalization
of the agricultural sector. China is now the second largest
producer of chickenmeat and the largest producer of eggs
in the world, with both chicken meat and eggs forming a
significant part of the daily Chinese diet. This growth in
both livestock production and antibiotic usage has been
and will continue to be facilitated by an ongoing struc-
tural reorganization of Chinese farms away from small-
scale operations to large commercial operations. While
this mirrors changes occurring in other countries such as
the United States, it has not been accompanied by a con-
comitant increase in food safety.
An awareness of the shortcomings of the current meat
production system has become more public from the turn
of the century, and this has been tied in the public con-
sciousness to questions of quality control in the produc-
tion and distribution of foodstuffs. A 2008 study showed
that 10 percent of rice sampled from the Yangtze Delta
was contaminated with cadmium (Zhen 2008), a figure
that rose to 37 percent in a study conducted in the fol-
lowing decade (Liu et al. 2016). In 2008 and 2009, ma-
jor food safety threats emerged from the adulteration of
Chinese milk and dairy products with melamine and the
infusion of insecticides into dumplings exported to Japan
(Japan Times 2008). All of these issues have been debated
in the Chinese social and public media. However, the
threat potential of AMR—from the overuse and abuse of
antibiotics in the agricultural sector—has been frequently
overlooked.
To combat the rise of disease in the commercial farm-
ing sector, Chinese agribusinesses have relied on a triple
cocktail of antibiotics. In addition to prophylactic and
therapeutic doses of antibiotics, feedstock is also laced
with antibiotics. While maximizing the growth poten-
tial of livestock is an intended outcome of this cock-
tail, as commercial farming has intensified in China, this
triple dose of antibiotics has become necessary to com-
bat the increasingly unhygienic conditions in whichmany
of these animals are raised. Here, the difference between
Chinese commercial farms and those in, for example, the
United States is stark. Cargill, for example, has begun to
phase out antibiotics use in its swineherds (Cargill un-
dated). This has been achieved with only slight increases
in disease prevalence and slight losses of growth potential
(Interview D 2017). Hence, the rationale to use antibi-
otics as a growth promoter that emerged after the Second
WorldWar, and which continues to dominate production
plans in Chinese commercial farms, is no longer necessar-
ily valid when a hygienic environment is established.6
Currently, there are no official data or informa-
tion on levels of antibiotics used in Chinese agriculture
(Krishnasamy, Otte, and Silbergeld 2015). In terms of
the volume of antibiotics used for animal husbandry in
China, Xiao estimated that 46 percent of the 210,000
tons of antibiotics produced in China are adminis-
tered through the livestock industry (Hvistendahl 2012).
Another 2012 estimate suggested that in China, 84.9
million pounds (38.5 million kg) of antibiotics were
used on livestock (Garrett and Laxminarayan 2017).
Krishnasamy, Otte, and Silbergeld (2015) suggested that
sulphonamides, tetracyclines, and fluoroquinolones (en-
rofloxacin, fleroxacin, and norfloxacin) are widely used
for animal husbandry in China. Of the two main
groups of meat products (pork and poultry) produced
in China, the authors calculated that 4.5 million kg of
antimicrobials were used for poultry production, while
34 million kg were used for swine production in China in
2012.
While the use of antibiotics for growth promotion,
disease prevention, and therapeutic purposes is a long-
standing practice of the food animal industry worldwide,
Van Boeckel et al. argue that the main goals of antibi-
otic administration are growth promotion and disease
prevention rather than disease treatment. China is no
6 A potential model for such an approach for China is
shown in Bloomberg (2016).
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exception. In China, while the human abuse of antibi-
otics is partly attributed to financial incentives for pub-
lic healthcare facilities to sell unnecessary and expen-
sive antibiotics, the overuse of antibiotics in the animal
husbandry sector is likewise induced by economic incen-
tives for the use of antibiotics as growth promoters. De-
spite the fact that data show little or even no economic
benefits in terms of meat production, growth promotion
uses are a major contributor to antibiotics usage in Chi-
nese food animal farms. As the largest antimicrobial con-
sumer of livestock in 2010, China used one-third of all
growth-stimulus antibiotics fed to livestock worldwide
(Van Boeckel et al. 2015).
The economic incentive that encourages antibiotics
use in livestock production was highlighted in an inter-
view with a chicken farmer in Guangdong province in
June 2017. Our interviewee stated that, “Chickens fed
with artificial feed premixed with antibiotics grow much
faster than those fed with homemade feed. It takes only
40 days for the former chickens to be ready to sell on the
market and 200 days for the latter” (Interview E 2017).
The same farmer noted that when he and other farmers
can access cheap human antibiotics, these are also fed to
the animals for either growth promotion or therapeutic
purposes. This echoes comments made by the head of a
Chinese microbiology lab whomentioned that “the effec-
tiveness of tetracycline [as a growth promoter] remains
inconsistent. In any case, farmers feel that tetracycline
and antibiotics in general facilitate livestock production,
and so they add antibiotics to livestock feed” (Interview
F 2016).
This belief in the use antibiotics as effective growth
promoters is likewise seen in China’s swine industry, es-
pecially the use of colistin (polymyxins E) in pig farms
(Zhongguo pinglun tongxunshe 2015). One reason for
colistin’s widespread application in piggeries is its tox-
icity, which meant Chinese authorities never approved
it for human use. Another reason is that colistin is an
older drug and so it is fairly cheap; therefore, Chinese
farmers can administer a large volume of colistin to-
gether with animal feed at a low cost. Recent figures
show that, as the world’s largest pig producer, China
is also the largest consumer of the 12,000 tons of col-
istin in agriculture each year (Zhang 2015). China is
also one of the world’s largest producers of colistin for
animal husbandry. Although the dangers posed by us-
ing such last-line antibiotics in livestock are well docu-
mented, only recently have these dangers been tied to the
use of colistin in the Chinese swine industry. In 2015,
MCR-1 was found in pigs in China. A year later, the
gene was identified in humans, some of whom had ac-
quired their infections from animals directly or from eat-
ing pork (Garrett and Laxminarayan 2017). MCR-1 is
now found on every continent. The global spread of the
gene implies that humans are losing a last-resort antibi-
otic for curing deadly drug-resistant superbug infections
(e.g., carbapenem-resistant infections). The emergence
of colistin resistance has sparked fears concerning pub-
lic health in China, renewing calls for urgent policy
responses to address the use of antibiotics for animal
husbandry.
While China has instituted programs to regulate the
clinical use of antimicrobials, limited efforts have been
made to reduce drug use in animal feed (Krishnasamy,
Otte, and Silbergeld 2015). Prior to 2016, China did not
impose any restrictions on antimicrobial growth promot-
ers (AGPs) and did not require veterinary prescriptions
for antibiotics use. In response to the 2015 discovery of
colistin-resistant bacteria on farms, China banned the use
of colistin as a growth stimulant for animals as stated in
the 2016 NAP (Hancock and Xia 2017). Reports, how-
ever, indicated that colistin remained freely available for
sale on Chinese markets (Lazarus 2016).
This again highlights the problem of financial coun-
terincentives and weak levels of regulatory enforcement,
where “law enforcement is always a problem in this
country [China]” (Interview F 2016). According to one
interviewee, “farmers will not change their behaviors un-
less the punishment is more significant than the benefits
they can gain” (Interview G 2016). It also reinforces our
argument that the securitization of AMR in China is not
being undertaken to address an existential threat. If it
were, an effective colistin and AGP ban would have been
promulgated. Indeed, as we have discussed throughout
this article, the logic of the Chinese securitization act is
to enable the policy center to gain greater enforcement ca-
pacity over its subnational counterparts. This conclusion
extends our earlier point that it is necessary to consider
the behavior of lower-level actors in applying macrosecu-
ritization approaches to encompass the necessity of tak-
ing the relationships between actors at different levels
into account, in this case, between the individual and the
state. The fact that even in authoritarian states—such as
China—the individual still has agency to resist or subvert
securitization acts further suggests that Vuori’s criticisms
of securitization being inherently Eurocentric need to be
reconsidered (Vuori 2008).
Apart from the weak enforcement of policies, the fo-
cus of current AMR-related regulations and guidelines in
China is mainly on human misuse rather than on animal
antibiotics use (as highlighted byWang et al. 2016).Wang
et al. (2016) also show that the Ministry of Agriculture
has not been involved in any of these AMR measures as
a major player. Without the greater involvement of the
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animal sector, the AMR problem in China can only
ever be half-solved. Given the obvious nutritional links
between animals and humans, ignoring the animal health
sector at the expense of public health priorities high-
lights the implications of competition between different
policy communities wherein intended outcomes—
addressing threats posed by AMR—are the result of
resource allocation debates between middle-tier state
agencies and their subnational counterparts.
Emerging Implications
Policy-Politics Implications
This policy competition also highlights the nonexisten-
tial nature of the AMR challenge in China. If AMR was
considered an existential threat to human wellbeing in
China, then the purpose of the securitization would be to
seek an end to the threat so that a normal mode of pol-
icy making and politics could resume. Such an act would
enable policy makers to address the prevalence of the
threat, equipped with emergency resources drawn from
as many sources as necessary. The imbalance in the Chi-
nese approach to AMR, coupled with a lack of resources
available to monitor the situation, suggest that at the cen-
tral level, AMR is being discursively securitized with only
the partial enactment of an emergency mode approach.
Moreover, the willingness of subnational authorities and
healthcare providers to not fully implement regulations
that would limit the impacts of antibiotics further sug-
gests that the target audience has not accepted the secu-
ritizing speech act.
The ability of subnational authorities to set aside
or resist central directives is not limited to the Chinese
health sector. This is particularly observable with pol-
icy initiatives that carry an economic cost to local ac-
tors. In terms of macroeconomic policies, Wang (2015,
336) concluded that when such policies run “contrary to
provincial economic rationality; consequently, provincial
governments tended to resist these policies.” Conversely,
when it comes to local resistance to tax reforms, Beijing
does not allow for deviations to reforms. That said, lo-
cal authorities must still implement additional revenue-
raising programs. As Bergsten et al. (2008, 77) noted, “in
the face of revenue pressures,many local officials have lit-
tle recourse but to ignore central directives on such issues
as growth planning and resource management.”
Here the presence of potentially significant economic
costs arising from a rapid introduction of new policies
designed to combat AMR—and the associated political
and social fallout—has created a political and policy dis-
incentive to make the shift into emergency mode. These
political and economic costs only serve to render mean-
ingful efforts made within states and at the global level
more problematic. As a senior official from a U.S. aid-
related agency further observed, “Nowadays, the world
is trying to reboot the AMR issue. However, the coordi-
nation does not exist with the absence of an emergency or
clear threat (i.e., a zoonotic disease outbreak that killed
both animals and humans)” (Interview H 2017). The ab-
sence of such coordination further argues against a per-
ception that AMR is an existential threat, even though its
potential is internationally acknowledged.
These cases of subnational pushback further sug-
gest that provincial and other lower-tier authorities
have a higher degree of policy autonomy than should
otherwise be the case under a centrally planned and
managed system. Heilmann (2008, 29) argues that “con-
ceptual dichotomies such as centralization vs. decentral-
ization, or constitutional concepts that suggest a stabil-
ity of vertical checks and balances, such as federalism,
cannot capture the oscillating dynamics of China’s
policy-making approach.” This form of “adaptive au-
thoritarianism” denotes “an entrenched process of pol-
icy generation” wherein both central and subnational
authorities are constantly negotiating and renegotiating
policy outcomes. This iterative process captures the am-
biguity that Buzan and Wæver (2009, 256, emphasis
added) identified, namely that macrosecuritization only
“possibly subsumes a host of other middle-level securi-
tizations.” In other words, even though subnational au-
thorities cannot be said to be independent actors, they
nonetheless have the capacity to pursue policies that are
distinct from those of the center, even when such policies
are unsupportive of an act of securitization.
What this means is that in the absence of an ex-
istential health threat—securitizing rhetoric and behav-
ior aside—Chinese AMR policies represent another facet
of the recentralization/decentralization struggle between
policy communities where central powers and authority
clash with local politics and economic-resource alloca-
tions. Given that it is primarily the economic capacities
of such subnational actors that imbue them with the abil-
ity to resist or distort central-level objectives, access to
external funding has become a key factor in getting cen-
tral policies accepted in the face of local uncertainties and
resistance. However, should an actual existential health
threat from AMR emerge, central authorities in Beijing
would likely enforce changes to current practices. From
the examples presented in the main body of this article, it
can be concluded that the threat posed by AMR has not
yet reached that perceptional threshold for action despite
rhetorical efforts to the contrary.
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The Role of the International Community
Both securitization and macrosecuritization theories uti-
lize levels of analysis, although the more recent macrose-
curitization better elucidates the impact that global-level
acts can have on states and lower tiers. What is clear is
that the decision to focus on AMR in China has been
a direct result of an opening provided by policy shifts
in global health security agendas. These shifts have been
particularly championed by the United States and the UK.
This has led to increased attention being paid to the issue
by other major states. Both the Centers for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention and the U.S. Agency for International
Development bring significant financial and human re-
sources to bear in developing states, which otherwise do
not have the capacity to securitize AMR. In China, while
most of public policy resources are focused at the na-
tional level in Beijing, both organizations work directly
with local officials in the provinces either on projects or in
terms of training field epidemiologists. Similarly, the UK
and European states have run capacity-building work-
shops on AMR in China. In parallel, the WHO and the
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Na-
tions (FAO) have been working with their state counter-
parts in developing AMR-related policies, although, as
noted above, the vertical nature of these global-state-level
relations have also hindered the effective implementation
of AMR responses.
However, an unexplored aspect of macrosecuritiza-
tion is the ways by which middle-tier actors can engage
with the macro-level processes in order to realize dif-
ferent goals. By expanding the focus of AMR efforts to
the global level, states are able to internally exert pol-
icy pressures that create a discursive policy space, which,
in turn, allows resistant domestic policy communities to
be bypassed. China is not a unique case in this instance.
Since AMR has been macrosecuritized, for example, all
the leading states (the United States, the UK, and the EU
states) have implemented new national policies to ad-
dress the threat despite opposition from internal lobby
groups. This is despite the fact that the threat posed by
AMR has been long recognized. As such, the recent ef-
forts made by the international community to macrose-
curitize AMR need to be unpacked, so as to illuminate
whether these acts represent global action on a global
threat or are designed to meet domestic agendas. While
acts that encompass both possibilities cannot be ruled
out, the motivations behind the macrosecuritization need
to be clarified in order to fully evaluate it.
The impact that external agencies can have on do-
mestic policy agendas comes down to the funding dif-
ferential and local political will. In this respect, there is a
clear distortive effect of such agencies in China, where lo-
cal officials, healthcare providers, and health researchers
adopt new research projects to secure funding. However,
as our interviewees confirmed, those who are unsuccess-
ful in bidding for international monies quickly return to
their original research interests. Equally, those who are
successful are unlikely to continue with this research once
grant monies expire unless the topic was being studied
previously. This does not mean that such monies cannot
have a catalyzing impact on policy and research com-
munities, but it does mean that, without a pre-existing
foundation for such activities, such impacts are likely to
be limited. As one interviewee suggested, “money” has
been the sole source of Chinese interest in AMR (In-
terview I 2016). Money in this context refers to finan-
cial support from non-Chinese sources. This financial
support advances the AMR macrosecuritization agenda
but is not sufficient to support ongoing, country-wide
programs.
Money is also perversely central to why the issue has
not progressed as far as the rhetorical acts would other-
wise suggest. As we argue, other epistemic communities
at the central and subnational levels have either com-
peting agendas or conflicting interests; all of which are
seeking financial, technological, and/or human resources
to advance their interests. When new financial resources
are allocated, these competing agenda groups seek to co-
opt them for their own programs. In the absence of a
truly existential threat that overrides this competition,
such behavior suggests that audience acceptance is more
about the outcome of power relations among stakehold-
ers (Balzacq 2015, 106). In this case, support for China’s
AMR policy has become a proxy for situating decision-
making authority and delegating resources between state
and subnational actors.
Nonetheless, due to the size of China’s population
and owing to its role as one of the world’s largest sup-
pliers of produce (particularly meat), this issue cannot
only remain a source of domestic policy contention. The
spread of the MCR-1 gene demonstrated how a signifi-
cant threat to the world’s capacity to fight antibiotic re-
sistance emerged from China’s misuse of antibiotics. The
impact of this domestic problem had global effects in less
than a year. Hence, an international interest in Chinese
policy making in this area will remain. However, such
external interest is frequently a source of geopolitical ten-
sion between China and other states and international
organizations.
Our interviewees noted that China has been refocus-
ing its international cooperation efforts on technical ar-
eas and away from policy cooperation and alignment
programs. This is partly a necessary endeavor to ad-
dress capacity shortfalls and is partly an effect of the
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current political climate in China. In this respect, the fo-
cus on AMR works for the Chinese leadership, as cur-
rent programs are largely concerned with surveillance
and microbiological impacts rather than with policy ini-
tiatives. As such, global health policy efforts on AMR are
screenedwhen applied to China: data collection and tech-
nological aspects are permitted, while social and public
health policy aspects are restricted or excluded. From our
interviews with representatives of international health or-
ganizations, external health agencies, and domestic ac-
tors, this shortcoming is well known, globally and within
China. However, the desire to address the threat of AMR
and to develop global action on the issue is governed by
realpolitik considerations that accept suboptimal com-
mitments in exchange for consensus building. Nonethe-
less, without a holistic approach that encompasses all as-
pects, AMR cannot be comprehensively addressed. The
unwillingness of the Chinese government to develop a
broad-based approach to AMR reinforces our central
argument that the current efforts to securitize the issue
are concerned with issues other than its existential threat
potential.
Conclusion
The above analysis inspires a number of conclusions,
including one on the need for greater complexity in
macrosecuritization theory. As this study demonstrates,
there is a clear need to go behind the speech act in
order to understand it.7 Hence, while Buzan, Wæver,
and de Wilde’s (1998) original assertion that anyone
can securitize anything remains valid, the assumption
that the process—when developed through its subsequent
stages—is intended to address an existential threat can
be challenged. Only by focusing on a pre-stage level at
which motivations for the securitizing act can be exam-
ined can the rationale for securitization be properly deter-
mined. Furthermore, when this rationale is absent or sub-
ordinated to another purpose, the macrosecuritization or
lower-tier securitizations can be said to be imperfectly (at
best) realized, if not substantively absent.
Moreover, the challenge of defining who the audience
is in an act of macrosecuritization remains problematic.
While Buzan andWæver’s workwould suggest that states
7 This conclusion echoes Nunes’ (2015) call for a bet-
ter understanding of politics leading to the securitiza-
tion act, although our idea was fully formed before we
became aware of Nunes’ work. It also partially mirrors
Bigo’s (2002, 72) observation that “the security process
itself is the result of mobilization of the work of political
discourses.”
are the audience, the theory also allows for lower tiers to
be subsumed into the process. At the same time, the the-
ory allows for contending lower-tier political or securiti-
zation agendas to exert bottom-up pressure on the pro-
cess.Hence, the notion of audience needs to be unpacked.
As our case study highlights, even as the Chinese state
has supported the macrosecuritization of AMR, subna-
tional and individual-level actors have ignored (partially
or completely) the resulting national directives. As we
have shown, this lower-tier resistance has come about
due to contending political and resource competitions
within the state. A question that arises beyond the scope
of this article is: To what extent does the emergency dis-
tribution of resources during securitization validate the
act itself? In this article, we have identified a negative
case—where the insufficient distribution of emergency re-
sources weakens audience acceptance and thus the do-
mestic securitization of AMR and, as a consequence, the
macrosecuritization of AMR.
The role of science in policy making in China also
comes under question. As we note in reference to the
MOHNARIN network, funds the state has made avail-
able are insufficient to operate a truly national surveil-
lance program despite claims to the contrary.While there
is also the CHINET network of sentinel hospitals and
laboratories as well as closed WeChat networks for clin-
icians and infectious disease researchers, these also have
gaps. Moreover, there is no sense of integration between
these different capacities. This leads to a patchwork ap-
proach to AMR, in particular, and to infectious disease
surveillance, more generally. Such a result is at odds with
China’s image as a centralized state that can implement
core directives as needed. Even in the age of Xi Jinping’s
China Dream, the provinces and lower-tier public health
agencies and institutions are able to disregard or imper-
fectly implement policies and practices when this suits
their needs.
The resource shortfall for basic surveillance further
means that the presence of either catalytic or topical
funding creates a powerful incentive for public health re-
searchers to reorient their efforts toward the new fund-
ing agenda. This implicitly creates a highly competitive
environment wherein support for funded activities de-
notes continued access to resources. In the case of China,
when the state does not supply sufficient funding, ex-
ternal health agencies and foundations can do so. How-
ever, as noted above, competition generated by resource
scarcities can create a perversely competitive environ-
ment wherein even viral samples are not shared between
local hospitals because when a host hospital runs an anal-
ysis it creates a basis for that hospital to seek additional
funding for training and equipment.
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Again, this is by no means a situation unique to
China. As Elbe (2010) demonstrated with reference to
H5N1 in Indonesia, the physical control of such sam-
ples can be leveraged by states to gain access to addi-
tional financial, human, or pharmaceutical resources. In
resource-constrained countries, such as China and In-
donesia, competition is more severe because resources are
scarcer. Equally, in Vietnam, the state simplymanages dis-
ease control, preferring not to expend scarce resources
on their elimination and only taking action when human
lives are threatened or when the issue attracts interna-
tional attention (Interview J 2017). This, in turn, means
that external donors can affect local public health prior-
ities disproportionate to the actual needs of the recipient
state and society.
This raises quite fundamental questions regarding the
priorities of Chinese public health policy-setting behav-
iors. China has been the source of two major infectious
disease outbreaks (SARS and H5N1) and of the emer-
gence of the MCR-1 gene. The reality of overlapping
living spaces between humans and animals at a time
when new ecosystems are continually exposed to physi-
cal infrastructure projects means that it is inevitable that
novel zoonotic diseases with cross-species potential will
emerge in China. This means that it is simply good policy
to address the threat posed by AMR. However, it only
works if the lower tiers of the Chinese nation-state are
able and willing to commit resources in pursuit of this
agenda.
Throughout this article, we have argued that the
health security threat posed by AMR in China is real but
that the securitizing act is not designed to directly address
the issue as an existential threat. Instead, the Chinese na-
tional authorities are using the issue to foster the cre-
ation of an enforceable policy framework that privileges
the policy-making center at the expense of subnational
authorities. In other words, as Wæver (2011, 474) put
it, undertaking the securitization for “other reasonings
than threat or necessity.” This politicized—rather than
securitized—perception of AMR is what allows policy
space for competing health or economic agendas to be
advanced at the lower tiers. It is only when this compe-
tition is mitigated or realigned that China can be said to
be truly supportive of the macrosecuritization of AMR.
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Interview B: Chinese public health academic, Beijing, De-
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